He allegedly created this consensus by provoking the Japanese into the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the revisionists describe it, Roosevelt purposefully increased tensions between Washington and Tokyo by introducing embargoes in 1940–41 on scrap metals and petroleum products that Japan needed for its war machine. By the fall of 1941, according to the revisionists, American policy makers had concluded that Japan would attack the U.S. fleet in Hawaii in the belief that the United States would then seek a settlement in the Pacific, thereby freeing Japan to create an East Asian “co-prosperity sphere.” Although Roosevelt and his closest advisers in the State, War, and Navy departments knew that an attack was imminent, the revisionists argue, they did not alert the military, believing that a surprise attack would create an overwhelming consensus for involvement in both the European and Pacific wars. As evidence of Roosevelt’s duplicity, they cite the fact that the administration failed to notify the military of decoded Japanese messages indicating that an attack would take place on December 6–7.
Among the first historians to argue in favour of the back-door-to-war theory were Charles Beard, author of American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940 (1946) and President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (1948), and Charles C. Tansill, author of Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941 (1952). Half a century later, journalist and presidential candidate Patrick J. Buchanan gave continuing life to the theory by insisting in his book A Republic, Not an Empire (1999) that, contrary to accepted opinion, the United States need not have fought in World War II. The country was forced into a conflict with the Axis powers only by Roosevelt’s determination to aid Britain and Russia against Hitler. Without American involvement in the fighting, Buchanan argued, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would have destroyed each other, thereby sparing the world the post-1945 Cold War.
The mainstream response
Most historians have rejected the claims of Beard, Tansill, and Buchanan as reductionist and unconvincing. These historians do agree that Roosevelt engaged in deception and manipulation to advance his foreign policies and that he was prevented from seeking a formal declaration of war in the first years of the fighting because of continued public support for U.S. neutrality. Nevertheless, they argue that this does not show that Roosevelt intentionally provoked the Japanese to attack the United States or that he allowed the country to be surprised at Pearl Harbor.
The problem of public opinion
Although there is no question that Roosevelt was concerned about public support for entering the war, this was not because he thought that he could not obtain a declaration without it—in late 1941, before the Pearl Harbor attack, he had enough votes in Congress to pass a formal declaration of war. Rather, according to most historians, his concern was that Americans would not be able to sustain such an enormous effort, with all its sacrifice of blood and treasure, unless they were united in the spirit of a moral crusade. Accordingly, in his major foreign policy decisions regarding the war in Europe in 1940–41, he was careful not to commit the country to greater involvement in the fighting than public opinion would support. The draft, the destroyer-bases exchange, the lend-lease program, convoying, and economic sanctions against Japan were all undertaken with Roosevelt’s belief that the public regarded them as vital to American national security. Contrary to the revisionist view, most historians regard these incremental decisions not as attempts to drag the country into the war but rather as efforts by Roosevelt to exercise all other options, in keeping with his deep reluctance to enter the fighting without the firm support of the American public.
Although Roosevelt did admit to Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that it would have been difficult to gain public support for war without the Japanese attack, nevertheless, according to most historians, he actually tried to avoid a war with Japan throughout 1941, fearing that it would limit America’s aid to Britain and lengthen the struggle against Germany. For example, in a discussion of the American embargo on Japan at a cabinet meeting on November 7, 1941, he said that the administration should “strain every nerve to satisfy and keep on good relations” with Japanese negotiators. He told Secretary of State Cordell Hull not to let the talks “deteriorate and break up if you can possibly help it. Let us make no move of ill will. Let us do nothing to precipitate a crisis.”
Warnings of a Japanese attack
Roosevelt and his advisers did foresee a Japanese military action on December 6–7. Nevertheless, most historians agree that they did not know where the attack would come. Intercepted Japanese diplomatic and military messages indicated an attack somewhere, but information suggesting that the target would be British, Dutch, or French possessions in Southeast Asia obscured other information suggesting Pearl Harbor. Moreover, as most historians point out, it is implausible to think that Roosevelt, a former assistant secretary of the Navy, would have exposed so much of the U.S. fleet to destruction at Pearl Harbor had he known an assault was coming. If his only purpose was to use a Japanese attack to bring the United States into the war, he could have done so with the loss of just a few destroyers and some airplanes. In fact, he was genuinely surprised by the target, if not the timing, of the Japanese attack. According to one scholar, Roberta Wohlstetter, this was partly the consequence of a tendency among U.S. military leaders to see the fleet in Hawaii as a deterrent rather than a target. It was also the result of a failure by U.S. military intelligence to measure Japanese capabilities accurately: the Americans did not believe that Japanese air and naval forces could mount a successful attack on U.S. bases in Hawaii.
Most historians believe that there was no back door to war and no conspiracy to trick the American public into a conflict it did not wish to fight in either Europe or Asia. American involvement in World War II, they argue, was the consequence of the country’s rise to global power and the resulting need to combat aggressive, undemocratic regimes that were hostile to American institutions and to the survival of the United States as a free country. However, the controversy has continued to be relevant in American political debate. Despite suggestions that Congress was validating the theory, its defense authorization bill in 2000 included a provision that would absolve Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, the military commanders at Pearl Harbor, of any blame for Japan’s attack, declaring that they were not “provided necessary and critical intelligence that would have alerted them to prepare for the attack.”